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Two Kings, Two Futures
 
Michael Hutt
Abstract
 
As small states located on the south side of the eastern Himalaya, Nepal and
Bhutan are superficially very similar. In both countries, a monarchy is in the
process of renegotiating its position and role, and in both, the current political
dispensation faces strong challenges. However, there are also distinct differ-
ences in how political developments are proceeding in Nepal and Bhutan.
 
Two Monarchies
 
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck of Bhutan claims to be
committed to divesting himself and his successors of their power and assuming
the status of a constitutional monarch. Responsibility for the government of
the country and for representing Bhutan in international forums was devolved to a
Council of Ministers, first elected by the National Assembly in 1998. In December
2002, the first draft of a Bhutanese constitution was submitted to the king for his
consideration. Bhutan’s highly conservative National Assembly protested that
the people of Bhutan would prefer to continue to be ruled by their benevolent,
visionary monarch, while external critics alleged that the drafting committee
is unlikely to have taken account of minority perspectives. However, it is con-
ceivable that Bhutan’s first written Constitution will represent an advance for
the country’s modernizers and a reversal for its traditionalists. Until its text is
sent out to districts for the promised consultative process to begin, the extent of
the changes proffered will remain unknown. However, fears of ethnic faction-
alism will probably prevent the establishment of a full-blown multiparty system.
In Nepal, by contrast, King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev has asserted
himself with vigor, as the Maoists’ challenge to the established order continues.
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In an unprecedented interview granted to 
 
Time
 
 magazine in January 2004,
Gyanendra declared: “The days of royalty being seen and not heard are over.
We are in the 21st century. It’s not that I am taking an active role. I see it as
a constructive role.” During the spring, a series of civic receptions was orga-
nized for the king and queen, the biggest being held at Pokhara on March 28.
These receptions were intended partly to demonstrate that there was nowhere
in Nepal that the king could not go to meet his subjects, despite the continued
virulence of the Maoist insurgency all across the land. At the Pokhara recep-
tion, Gyanendra promised that general elections to a reestablished House of
Representatives would be held before mid-April 2005. But most Nepali politi-
cians were of the opinion that general elections remained a practical impossi-
bility, given the security situation in the country.
 
Opposition in Bhutan
 
There was little sign of any oppositional activity inside Bhutan, where exter-
nal threats provoked an upsurge in expressions of patriotic loyalty. On Decem-
ber 15, 2003, the Royal Bhutan Army launched a military offensive against the
United Liberation Front of Assam, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland,
and the Kamtapur Liberation Organization—Indian separatist organizations that
had been operating from bases in southern districts of Bhutan since the early
1990s. By early January, after three weeks of conflict, the military operation
was deemed to have been a complete success: the camps had been dismantled,
the insurgents had fled, and the Royal Bhutan Army had suffered only a small
number of fatalities. Some journalists suspected that the small Royal Bhutan
Army, which had never engaged in such an operation before, must have bene-
fited from Indian military assistance, but this was categorically denied by offi-
cials from both countries.
The space for internal public debate and Bhutan’s exposure to the outside
world increased gradually, and mildly dissenting views were sometimes ex-
pressed in the readers’ forum on the website of the kingdom’s only news-
paper.
 
1
 
 As in previous years, however, the only really trenchant opposition to
the Bhutan government came from Bhutanese refugees in Nepal.
The governments of Nepal and Bhutan had agreed during 2003 that the pro-
cess of repatriating the small number of those residents of Khudunabari refu-
gee camp who had been verified as “bona fide Bhutanese” would begin in
mid-February 2004. However, this did not take place, ostensibly because of an
incident that occurred on December 22, 2003, when the Bhutanese Joint Veri-
fication Team (JVT) visited the camp. The JVT’s leader explained the terms
under which people were to be allowed to return, but his announcement met
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with an angry response, during which it is alleged that stones were thrown and
the Bhutanese officials were manhandled. The entire Bhutanese team returned
to Bhutan the day after the incident, demanding that the Nepal government
mount an inquiry. Although Nepal did so, the process has remained stalled
ever since. In 2004, it was reported that refugees had begun to join the Com-
munist Party of Nepal (Maoist), and this was noted with alarm by Bhutan’s
National Assembly during its July session.
 
The King, the Parties, and the 
Maoists in Nepal
 
In Nepal, Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa resigned on May 7. Thus, the
second government established since the king took back power in October
2002 collapsed. King Gyanendra granted audiences to a succession of politi-
cal leaders and seemed to be considering appointing yet another pro-palace
stalwart. Faced by growing political protests, however, he eventually asked the
parties to agree on a nomination for the next prime minister. Unfortunately,
they failed to reach a consensus and on June 2, the king reinstated Sher Baha-
dur Deuba, the prime minister he had dismissed in October 2002 on the
grounds that he was incapable of holding general elections. One month later,
Deuba appointed a cabinet that included representatives of four of the five
main parliamentary political parties: the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified
Marxist-Leninist), the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (National Democratic Party,
RPP), the Nepali Congress (Democratic), and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party. The
pro-monarchy RPP was more heavily represented than it was strictly entitled
to be, while the Nepali Congress, led by Girija Prasad Koirala, from which
Deuba led a breakaway faction, refused to join the cabinet, vowing to continue
its agitation against “regression” with the aid of three smaller parties. How-
ever, the king’s appointment of Deuba effectively reduced the base of this agi-
tation and also produced schisms within several of the parties that joined
Deuba’s government.
Maoist influence spread during the year, especially in the western Tarai Dis-
tricts. In roughly three-quarters of Nepal, neither the government nor the Mao-
ists was in complete control. On March 3, Maoists attacked the town of
Bhojpur in the eastern hills of Nepal, killing approximately 32 security per-
sonnel and destroying much of its administrative infrastructure. On March 20,
they attacked Beni, in the western hills of Myagdi, killing about 30 security
personnel in the initial attack and the firefight that followed when the Royal
Nepalese Army retook the town. From Beni, they also abducted the head of
the local administration and the deputy superintendent of police, along with
about 30 police personnel. The Maoists suffered many casualties in both inci-
dents. Contrary to claims by the government, it was clear that the Maoists had
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not lost the capacity to stage massive assaults that had characterized their
strategy in earlier years.
However, the Maoists know that much of their support is hollow and based
on fear. Maoist cadres have taken to mounting temporary abductions of large
numbers of school teachers and students, who are taken to remote locations and
subjected to political indoctrination sessions. Twelve- and 13-year-olds are
given uniforms, treated with respect, and taught to handle guns.
The Maoists adopted two further strategies during 2004. The first was to en-
force blockades on the district headquarters of the western districts, and also
on the Kathmandu valley. These have met with considerable success, although
the blockade of the valley was lifted after only one week. The second strategy
has been to try to create an atmosphere of fear in the capital, with small bomb
blasts––usually aimed at government offices––and threats against companies
in which members of the royal family own interests or in which the Maoists
consider that workers are not properly treated. Despite these efforts, the capi-
tal’s economy continues to boom, and Kathmandu is largely unaware of the
increasing desperation in the districts.
The execution of 12 Nepali hostages in Iraq on August 31 provoked several
days of rioting and arson in Kathmandu and other towns; security forces re-
sponded by imposing curfews in many places. The targets singled out for at-
tack by rioters included not only the manpower agencies blamed for duping
and exploiting Nepali laborers but also mosques, Middle Eastern airline of-
fices, and newspaper offices. It is widely believed that right-wing Hindu ele-
ments took this opportunity to attempt to create the kind of communal hatred
that has been largely absent from Nepal to date.
 
External Forces
 
The international community is becoming increasingly worried about the po-
litical impasse in Nepal. India and the U.S. have supplied the Royal Nepalese
Army with hardware, training, and technical support, and the U.K. has pro-
vided non-lethal assistance such as surveillance aircraft. However, several for-
eign donor governments appear to be less than comfortable with the American
policy of providing the Royal Nepalese Army with weaponry and are begin-
ning to lay more stress upon the need for reestablishing the country’s demo-
cratic institutions and processes. The Indian government sees the increasing
involvement of Western governments as a threat to its own interests in Nepal,
and the new Indian administration is likely to become more proactive in its
Nepal policy.
In Nepal, King Gyanendra retains the unequivocal loyalty of the Royal Ne-
palese Army, which was deployed against the Maoists in November 2001.
However, his popularity remains low among the population at large, and dur-
ing 2004, an internal debate on whether Nepal should become a republic
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became increasingly audible. While this will be resisted strongly, not least by
the army, most observers agree that Nepal’s problems will not be solved by mil-
itary means and that a political solution is the only answer. The problem with
this is that a solution that does not grant the Maoists some share in power will not
be durable; any solution that does include them will be seen by the Maoists as
merely a first step on the road to a republican state, which is their ultimate aim.
Military actions in Bhutan’s south briefly drew some attention in interna-
tional news media, but otherwise, Bhutan received its usual measure of exoti-
cizing coverage: the allegedly negative cultural impact of television was a
particular focus and the government’s attempts to ban sales of tobacco prod-
ucts also aroused some curiosity. Bhutan does not have bilateral relations with
the main Western powers and is guided by India in its foreign relations.
Bhutan’s transition to a limited form of democracy proceeds slowly, and
King Jigme’s position appears secure. However, the success of this political
experiment will depend very heavily on the continued acquiescence of the
international community, particularly India, to Bhutan’s exclusion of a large
section of its ethnic Nepali population, and on the country’s ability to shield
itself from increasing instability in India’s northeast.
